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Introduction
Transitioning to a more sustainable world requires changes 
in technologies, economies, and societies. While a few of 
these changes may occur spontaneously, most experts 
agree that some level of policy intervention is necessary 
(Loorbach 2010; Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and Meadow-
croft 2012). Even in advanced democracies, policy making 
tends to be reactive, rather than proactive. That is, gov-
ernments respond to the complaints of powerful constitu-
encies, rather than working to prevent problems before 
they occur (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Sabatier and 
Brasher 1993; Kingdon 2011; Webster 2015a; de  Gooyert 
et al. 2016). Thus, we can expect more attention—and 
more action—on an environmental problem when related 
costs are felt by powerful interest groups or, in democra-
cies, by a majority of the public. Although this responsive-
ness is problematic in itself, delaying policy making and 
increasing the risk of major environmental catastrophes, 
the political will created by environmental stresses can 
also be co-opted or channeled into unhelpful responses 
( Hendriks 2009). These pitfalls in the path to sustainabil-
ity are dangerous and need to be avoided for a successful 
transition.
In this paper, I use The Lathe of Heaven by Ursula 
Le Guin (1976; reprint of 1971 edition) to explore a range 
of factors that prevent effective environmental govern-
ance and hinder the transition to sustainability, which 
requires political as well as socio-technological evolution 
(Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and Meadowcroft 2012; Voß and 
Bornemann 2011). Le Guin is one of the few authors of 
science fiction who writes about transition itself, rather 
than building up a fictional future and leaving the source 
of transition to the imagination of the reader. Several of 
her books (e.g. The Phoenix, The Eye of the Heron) center 
on political transition via revolution but in Lathe she grap-
ples with social and psychological aspects of transitions to 
a more peaceful and sustainable planet. Although politics 
are peripheral in this book, it remains an apt allegory for 
modern sustainability transitions. 
Lathe features many of the deep social problems that we 
still fear—and even experience—today. Overpopulation, 
food shortages, global warming, polluted air and water, 
and war in the Middle East are just a few examples of 
the elements that give her dystopia an enduring depth. 
However, her story warns of a deeper concern, the ancient 
“road to hell”, paved and trodden by would be saviors 
with the best intentions. Each of the three main charac-
ters in the book, George Orr, William Haber, and Heather 
Lelache, represents a different category of political actor 
and the interactions between them parallel processes in 
modern environmental politics. Orr embodies the apa-
thetic public, Haber epitomizes the well-intentioned but 
disconnected policy maker, and Lelache symbolizes the 
marginalized peoples who have little power but are heav-
ily impacted both by environmental problems and by ill-
conceived solutions. The construct of “effective dreams” 
provides both the dramatic tension and the power to 
transform the world—always at a cost.
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This essay draws on Lathe to highlight two major 
 political factors that hinder sustainability transitions. 
First, the power disconnect, which occurs whenever those 
who experience environmental harm are politically mar-
ginalized. This is similar to the fractured politics of tran-
sition depicted by Hendriks (2016) but includes minority 
and disenfranchised groups as well as the public. Second, 
cycles of rationalization widen power disconnects by 
allowing decision makers to take credit for positive policy 
outcomes while blaming others for negative impacts. The 
public may eventually be roused from its apathy to fight 
for the rights of the marginalized (as per the storyline 
in Lathe) but large portions of the public may also par-
ticipate in cycles of rationalization, blaming the margin-
alized, political leaders, or others for problems that are 
caused by the whole of society. 
As shown allegorically in Lathe, there are three related 
“minor” pitfalls that also plague disconnected systems 
and foster cycles of rationalization. First, decision makers 
tend to favor silver bullets or relatively simplistic solutions 
that are politically expedient. By their nature, these sim-
ple solutions do not solve problems, but instead postpone 
effective response. One way to dampen problem signals 
via silver bullets is to shift costs from elites to marginal-
ized populations, creating negative side effects. There can 
be unintended consequences associated with any type of 
environmental regulation, but this second pitfall is most 
common in highly disconnected systems. Third, when 
ongoing problems and negative side-effects become too 
pressing to ignore, decision makers (and the public) can 
deny responsibility by blaming scapegoats. More than any 
other pitfall, attributing the costs of governance failures 
to scapegoats facilitates cycles of rationalization. 
Because governance is reactive rather than proactive, 
these five factors tend to delay effective response to envi-
ronmental governance and perpetuate grave injustices. As 
Webster (2015a) points out, when power disconnects are 
wide, governance tends to go through multiple cycles of 
ineffective response because full problem signals are not 
reaching decision makers. This effect is further amplified 
by cycles of rationalization, which reinforce the use of sil-
ver bullets by placing the blame for negative side effects 
on scapegoats. As long as the environmental problem is 
escalating, a system that is stuck in an ineffective cycle 
will eventually be driven to some crisis point, when it will 
either collapse or be forced to transition into a more effec-
tive cycle. In Lathe, this point occurs at the turning point 
near the end of the book, but real systems usually cycle 
back and forth between effective and ineffective cycles in 
a process called the governance treadmill.  
This paper starts by parsing out the political allegory in 
Lathe as it relates to the major pitfalls described above: 
power disconnects and cycles of rationalization. Minor 
pitfalls are covered under the later because, while each 
causes problems in its own right, the feedback between 
silver bullets, side effects, and scapegoats is an important 
component in cycles of rationalization. The next section 
describes the governance treadmill and shows how it is 
depicted in Lathe. The third section delves into historical 
and modern events to demonstrate how the five pitfalls 
together affect the governance treadmill, both within Le 
Guin’s allegory and in the real world. The paper concludes 
with the need for further exploration of the governance 
treadmill and explicit inclusion of the five pitfalls in an 
interdisciplinary research program to study political-
socio-technological transitions.
Political pitfalls in Lathe
Written in 1971, Le Guin’s Lathe depicts a dystopian future 
in the best tradition of the genre. However, the genius 
of the book lies in the plot device of “effective dreams”, 
which allow the protagonist, George Orr, to change the 
world—past, present, and future—with little to no effort. 
When Orr is placed in psychiatric care, his councilor, Wil-
liam Haber, appropriates this power by using a device 
to control Orr’s dreams. This sets the stage for conflict 
between characters with very different personalities. 
Where Orr is connected, humble, and passive, Haber is 
distanced, arrogant, and aggressive. Orr fears the power in 
his dreams but Haber embraces it as a means to improve 
the imperfect world in which they both live. One would 
do nothing, the other everything. The imbalance between 
them is the difference between a Malthusian nightmare, 
which is caused by insufficient collective action, and an 
Orwellian nightmare, which results from the arrogant use 
of power by a disconnected individual or group.1 However, 
it is the character of Lelache who truly represents the dis-
possessed and who, with many unnamed actors, pays the 
highest price for Haber’s hubris and Orr’s inaction.
Power disconnects
This section describes how power disconnects are repre-
sented in Lathe. According to Webster (2015a), a power 
disconnect occurs when the people who feel the costs 
of environmental harm are unable to change envi-
ronmental policy. When power disconnects are wide, 
political will tends to be low and policy responses favor 
the status quo, even if environmental damage is quite 
high. When disconnects are narrow, political will to 
solve environmental problems is high, and policies are 
more likely to be effective at reducing environmental 
harms, though costs may still be transferred to margin-
alized populations who might otherwise be more insu-
lated from environmental damage (e.g. construction of 
a levee that protects a wealthy district while diverting 
floodwater closer to a poor community). This depiction 
of politics is somewhat different from the literature on 
sustainability transitions, which tends to focus on general 
representation/deliberation (Hendriks 2016; Ercan and 
Hendriks 2013) or on preventing consolidation of power 
by local elites (Voß and Bornemann 2011). Moreover, this 
perspective highlights the role of the dynamic incentives 
associated with environmental impacts as well as more 
static incentive structures such as economic advancement 
or a quest for political power. Such incentives are largely 
ignored in the transitions literature, which tends to be 
constructivist (governance is socially constructed), even 
though  Giddens’ (1979) work on structuration, which 
recognizes the feedbacks between governance structures 
and human actions, is often cited.2
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Each of the three main characters in Lathe represents 
an ideal type in their own right, but the conflict between 
them is essentially a story of power disconnects. On the 
one hand, the character George Orr has no ambition 
beyond leading a normal life. Pallid and thin, he is the epit-
ome of average, content with his place in the world, even 
though, “undernourishment, overcrowding, and pervad-
ing foulness of the environment were the norm” (p. 31). 
Indeed, his effective dreams seem to be his only extraor-
dinary aspect. These dreams do not change the future per 
se, but rather shift the world to a different “continuum” in 
which the past has changed to make a new present pos-
sible. Only Orr and those who are with him at the moment 
of change remember what previous version of the world 
existed before each effective dream. Until assigned to 
Haber for his “Voluntary Therapeutic Treatment (VTT)”, 
Orr only had effective dreams under conditions of severe 
stress. In these cases, the stressor was usually removed via 
the dream and, with so many stressors in his life, Orr was 
deeply anxious about the activities of his dreaming mind. 
In spite of the squalor of the Malthusian dystopia he 
lives in, Orr would be happy to work, love, have a fam-
ily, and lead a “simple” life. Heidegger and other philoso-
phers refer to this as getting caught up in the “everyday” 
(Seckinelgin 2006; Heidegger 2010 [1953]). This political 
apathy allows interest groups to develop policy monopo-
lies, controlling public resources and usurping political 
power (R. Hardin 1995). At the beginning of the book, the 
effects of this dynamic are reflected in the invasive nature 
of the government, which uses many methods to control 
the population in the face of severe shortages of food, 
housing, and other necessities. Rationing is required for 
almost everything, including recreational drugs, which are 
provided in limited amounts for free via tightly monitored 
“pharm cards”. There are also pseudo-cigarettes labeled 
“tranks”, “derricks”, and “transcaps” that are designed to 
keep people content with what little they have. At the 
extreme, there is even a story about a government pro-
gram that experimented with induced agoraphobia to 
ensure that people would be happy in the crowded condi-
tions of the city. 
This focus on placating and controlling the popula-
tion—keeping them happy even though their everyday 
is impoverished—is a major concern of the government 
because when that everyday life is threatened, the pub-
lic can be mobilized to bring about political change (R. 
Hardin 1982; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Hirschman 
1993). In the story, we never see the public itself rise 
up but this dynamic is reflected in the behavior of Orr’s 
character. He is generally passive throughout most of the 
book. After the first round of changes instigated by Haber, 
Orr starts to avoid his “therapy” sessions and even goes 
so far as to engage a civil rights attorney (Lelache) to get 
away from Haber. Lelache is not able to stop the treat-
ments, but she and Orr fall in love, which enriches Orr’s 
everyday considerably. With no legal recourse, Orr’s treat-
ments continue, as do the negative effects of the dreams 
that Haber controls. Orr does not really fight back against 
Haber again until his everyday life is destroyed by the loss 
of the Lalache. She represents his chance at a normal life 
and, while he tolerates some erosion of her personality, he 
rebels when she is taken away. 
Haber himself is a personification of the special interest 
groups and political elites who take advantage of the apa-
thy of latent interest groups (those caught up in the eve-
ryday; R. Hardin 1982). Large and imposing, with red hair 
and beard, Haber is a dream specialist who believes deeply 
in the power of dreams. With the confident geniality of a 
therapist, he is the embodiment of well-meaning hubris. 
Everything in his “plasticoated” office has the veneer of 
power and success but is fundamentally cheap and flimsy. 
At first, Haber takes Orr for an average patient, who has a 
fear of bad dreams due to repressed sexuality or dissatis-
faction with life. His interest is piqued as Orr explains the 
nature of his effective dreaming and, although Haber does 
not believe Orr, he patronizingly accepts them as an aspect 
of Orr’s reality. Not a bad man or a necessarily bad thera-
pist, Haber really believes that he will be able to “fix” Orr 
using a machine he has invented called “the Augmentor”. 
It feeds brain wave patterns to a subject in order to induce 
particular states. In this story, Haber uses it to get Orr to 
dream effectively upon hypnotic suggestion. Already we 
see that the doctor has no fear about controlling other 
people’s minds—in fact, he seems to enjoy it.
Haber is all about control, of himself and of others. When 
first confronted with evidence of the effectiveness of Orr’s 
dreams, the doctor’s biggest fear is losing control of him-
self in front of his patient. He cannot even comprehend 
Orr’s anxiety about his ability to change the world and 
quickly begins to suggest (hypnotically) that Orr dream up 
solutions—both to their own individual complaints and to 
the broader difficulties face by the city and the planet. The 
problems that Haber takes on through Orr’s dreams are 
well-known: overpopulation, pollution, resource scarcity, 
injustice, and conflict. However, with each new effective 
dream Haber’s own position improves while negative side 
effects leave many people much worse off. Thus, although 
Haber is not satisfied with the everyday like Orr, he is 
willing to accept costs imposed on the rest of society as 
long as his desire for power and prestige is fulfilled. Of 
course, Haber does not think of it in this way, but rather 
engages in a cycle of rationalization as described in the 
next section.
As mentioned above, the third character, Heather 
Lelache, is a civil rights attorney brought in by Orr in his 
initial attempts to avoid VTT with Haber. Orr and Lelache 
eventually fall in love, but she is not able to help him end 
Haber’s abuse of his effective dreams. Although she does 
not appear as frequently as either Orr or Haber, her role 
exposes one of the most important aspects of Haber’s 
brave new world.3 Originally a brassy, confident, and some-
what angry woman, Lelache is literally obliterated when 
Haber suggests that Orr should dream up a solution to the 
problem of racism. To Haber’s delight, race disappears as 
all of humanity has always been one color, grey. The child 
of a white mother and a black father, Lelache cannot exist 
as herself in this world. It is Orr’s desperation to bring 
Lelache back into his life that starts him dreaming with-
out Haber. With a little help from his friends, Orr dreams 
up a grey version of Lelache. Without the complications of 
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race she is a softer and more timid woman, bland, like the 
still plentiful but uninteresting food that is available on 
this version of the planet.
The implications of this segment of the story are pro-
found. If Orr represents the public and Haber represents 
political elites, Lelache represents those marginalized 
populations who have little or no political power yet 
experience the highest costs of environmental problems 
or sustainability transitions. For instance, women bear the 
largest environmental burden in some countries, but are 
often socially and politically marginalized and so cannot 
protect their own interests (Young 2012; Collier, Conway, 
and Venables 2008; Hultman and Bozmoski 2006). 
Indigenous peoples in the Arctic or other areas that are 
vulnerable to climate change tend to have little say in 
environmental policies at domestic or international levels. 
Poor people from developing countries also experience 
heavy costs from climate change but have little ability to 
change the positions of their governments (e.g. China). At 
the international level, developing country governments 
that favor mitigation (e.g. the Maldives) or assistance 
with adaptation (e.g. the G-70) have little power to either 
reduce greenhouse gasses directly or to negotiate faster 
mitigation or adaptation policies (IPCC 2014; Harrison 
and Sundstrom 2007; Rq, Dqg, and Victor 2016). These 
are the silent masses who were not named characters in 
Lathe, but who, like Lelache, simply disappeared as Haber 
tried time and again to create his ideal world.
The dynamics of policy monopolies, public apathy, and 
related power disconnects can be a major road block to 
sustainability transitions. Like Haber, political elites tend 
to be isolated from the negative impacts of their deci-
sions and may even receive personal benefits in the form 
of increased prestige, etc. (Ercan and Hendriks 2013; 
Hendriks 2009). Like Orr, the general public tends to be 
buried in the everyday and unwilling to engage in politi-
cal activities until direct threats or harms are felt at home. 
Yet, both Orr and Haber were insulated from significant 
harm until the very end of the book, much as the (voting) 
middle class and political elites tend to be more insulated 
from environmental problems than the poor in developed 
and developing countries (IPCC 2014). Lelache repre-
sents these marginalized peoples not just in her lack of 
power to prevent the changes wrought by Haber, but also 
because she had to rely on Orr to bring her back into the 
world. Similarly, when power disconnects are wide, mar-
ginalized peoples often are first harmed by environmental 
degradation and then may be forced to bear the costs of 
mitigation or adaptation as well if their interests are not 
protected by legal requirements, grassroots movements, 
or powerful non-governmental organizations. 
Cycles of rationalization
Even when disconnects are narrow and there is strong 
political will, regulatory momentum can be diverted 
into policy responses that are either ineffective or unjust 
(or both). Furthermore, these measures can then feed 
into cycles of rationalization that cause power discon-
nects to widen, amplifying their negative impacts. The 
story arc in Lathe illustrates three elements of the cycle 
of rationalization that can also stand as separate  barriers 
to  sustainability transition: silver bullets, side effects, 
and scapegoats. Silver bullets are policy options that are 
applied as panaceas—measures that are expected to work 
regardless of context or application. Side effects can range 
from displacing environmental harm geographically to 
shifting the economic costs of a problem to different 
actors. Scapegoats are factors (or people) that do not actu-
ally cause a problem but which are blamed for it. Each of 
these minor pitfalls can be a problem in its own right, but 
it is the feedbacks between them that can lead to cascades 
of destabilizing change. That is, silver bullets usually cre-
ate negative side effects, which then force decision-mak-
ers to rationalize their decisions ex-post using different 
types of scapegoats. This ensures that those with power 
retain it and that they fail to learn useful lessons from 
their mistakes. 
The positive feedback associated with cycles of ration-
alization is clear in Lathe. To begin with, it is difficult to 
imagine a panacea that would be easier or more power-
ful than the “effective dreams” of George Orr. All Haber 
had to do to use these dreams was to hook Orr up to the 
Augmenter, hypnotize him (Orr was highly susceptible 
to hypnosis), and suggest a new problem to solve. Orr’s 
dreaming mind did the rest. Real-world panaceas are not 
usually so simple, but they do tend to oversimplify, and can 
include everything from basic command-and-control reg-
ulations to “thin” or incomplete applications of otherwise 
complex, reflexive approaches such as transition manage-
ment, adaptive management, or co-management (Avelino 
2009; Meadowcroft 2011; Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and 
Meadowcroft 2012; Cox et al. 2016). 
Every time Haber attempts to use Orr’s ability as a silver 
bullet for the world’s problems, there is a trade-off in the 
form of negative side effects. As noted above, in Haber’s 
first attempt to save the planet he gave Orr vague instruc-
tions to solve the “population problem” while he was 
dreaming. The positive effects of the dream were clear. 
Orr returned home through a much less crowded city to 
a three-bedroom apartment with its own bathroom and a 
fridge stocked with more food than he could have imag-
ined before. His body had changed, too, filling out a bit 
because of the greater availability of food over his longer 
lifetime. He also enjoyed the feel of a real cotton shirt, 
which had been an extraordinary luxury just that morn-
ing. However, the cost of all this was an epidemic of cancer 
that had plagued the world years before, an example of 
how Orr’s dreams change the past to affect the present.
After that fateful session, Orr was wracked with guilt. 
To him, the benefits of a small population were not worth 
the cost in lives, but Haber accepted the tradeoffs, even 
though he also lost several close family members during 
the “Plague Years”. Again, this is partly because he was 
psychologically disconnected from others, but two addi-
tional factors are also important. First, Haber benefited 
more from the change than Orr, moving up in status and 
prestige, as well as improved health, comforts, etc. Indeed, 
he is transformed from an obscure crank on the fringe of 
science to a respected researcher on the cutting edge of 
the well-established field of dream science. Second, Haber 
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attributes the benefits of a lower population to his own 
action (suggesting the dream to Orr), but blames the nega-
tive side effects on Orr’s inability to interpret his instruc-
tions correctly. By establishing Orr as the scapegoat, Haber 
sets up a positive feedback loop in which any benefits 
from his suggested changes to the world reinforce his 
identity as benevolent savior—and his entitlement to per-
sonal benefits from said changes—while any costs are laid 
at the feet of the weak and imperfect Orr. 
Indeed, having “solved” one problem, Haber is even 
more determined to use Orr’s dreams to “solve” others. A 
second side effect of the population dream was an esca-
lation of the war in the Middle East, which was a fester-
ing sore before the population dream but was verging on 
full-scale world war after. Even Brazil was choosing sides 
in the conflict. Seeing this as a problem caused by Orr’s 
failures rather than his own “success”, Haber tried to right 
the new wrong using the same old method; he suggested 
that Orr should dream of world peace. This, too caused 
negative side-effects but also allowed Haber to move up in 
the world, as he was consulted by government ministers 
in addition to his higher standing in academia. 
All of these changes simply fed Haber’s ambition 
and hubris as the cycle continued. While some things, 
like geography and the greenhouse effect were outside 
of Orr’s purview, changes kept piling up as Haber tried 
one “improvement” after another. Portland became the 
home of the World Planning Center (WPC) of the supra-
national Federation of Peoples; a planetary government 
that had existed since the Plague years. As the capital 
of the planet, Portland was populated with majestic 
skyscrapers and government buildings. People from all 
over the world congregated in the city. In his increas-
ingly “perfect” world, Haber was in charge of the Human 
Utility: Research and Development Center of the WPC. 
Otherwise known as HURAD, the center resided in the 
grandest government building, where the words “The 
Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” are inscribed 
boldly in the portico. 
There were some benefits to the public at large, too, 
including large swaths of remaining wilderness, increased 
biodiversity, clearer air, and less difficult living conditions. 
However, the costs were also high. As described above, to 
end racism, Orr’s dreams made everyone gray, obliterat-
ing multi-ethic people like Lelache and causing cultural 
impoverishment. It is also interesting to note that fam-
ine continued in less-privileged countries and that the 
food available for people like Orr and Haber was bland 
and unappealing, in part because of the lack of diversity 
but also because of “sustainable” methods used in its pro-
duction. The end to the war in the Middle East was only 
brought about by an invasion of rather confused aliens and 
world peace came at the cost of civilization; after one of 
Orr’s dreams, TV and other forms of entertainment disap-
peared to be replaced by a modern-day coliseum, in which 
spectators sated their blood lust watching sports teams 
kill each other, rather than going to war. Personal liberty 
was another victim of Haber’s interventions. Togetherness 
and civic responsibility became the zeitgeist of the times, 
and genetic purity the mantra. Certified citizens carried 
hypoderm guns with which to euthanize criminals on the 
street. Diseases like cancer became a crime. 
With each new set of tradeoffs, the relationship between 
Orr and Haber becomes more strained. As Orr regains his 
equilibrium by reconnecting with other human beings, 
Haber’s “progress” only feeds his insatiable desire for 
power. Orr’s own empowerment comes a bit too late; he 
finally refuses to be used by Haber only after the doctor 
has enough data to use “the Augmenter” to induce effec-
tive dreams in ordinary individuals. This allows Haber to 
eliminate Orr as the instrument—which he does easily by 
“suggesting” that Orr dream that he doesn’t have effective 
dreams—and thereby end all of the imperfections sup-
posedly generated by Orr’s resistance to Haber’s plans. By 
doing so, Haber removes the scapegoat, Orr, but of course 
does nothing to solve the underlying problem.
As in so many allegories, it is Haber himself who, in 
this constant drive for improvement, destroys his own 
creation. Haber’s effective dreams are so disconnected 
that they threaten the very fabric of the world. Without 
the power to dream any longer, Orr must save the world 
the old fashioned way, by ending Haber’s dream. In this 
he serves as an iconic hero, struggling alone against the 
maelstrom to turn off the Augmentor, rendering the mad 
scientist ineffective. Nevertheless, when Orr emerges, he 
rejoins the rest of society in the struggle to rebuild their 
lives together, as a community and a polity. This is the 
lesson he has learned: it is important to help others but 
only as a member of the group, not as a god-like, well-
intentioned tyrant.4
Of course, not all decision-makers are as disconnected as 
Haber, though power does often lead to Haberian behav-
ior on the part of political elites. There are many bureau-
crats, managers, and politicians who don’t let power “go 
to their heads”, often by maintaining strong connections 
to the people who and most affected by their decisions 
(Prendergast 2016; Oberfield 2014). On the other hand, 
the cycles of rationalization described above do occur 
frequently and their foundations are well-supported in 
the literature. Psychological studies show that power can 
create disconnects. For instance, when average individu-
als are given power over others they tend to dehuman-
ize those they control, even if there are no derogatory 
interactions between the groups (Gwinn, Judd, and Park 
2013; Zimbardo et al. 1973; Inesi, Gruenfeld, and Galinsky 
2012). Furthermore, both high- and low-power individu-
als tend to remember goal-facilitating information, but 
high-power individuals tend to forget goal-constraining 
information much more than low-power individuals 
(Whitson et al. 2012). It is difficult to tell whether or not 
there is some element of self-selection here. That is, do 
individuals gain power because they are able to ignore 
constraining information or do they start ignoring con-
straining information when they gain power? Most likely 
there is a feedback that magnifies pre-existing tendencies 
as individuals gain power and feel the need to rationalize 
its use (Oberfield 2012).
Ironically, leaders may create the above psychological 
disconnects in part because they are so often blamed when 
collective decisions produce negative side effects (Duch, 
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Przepiorka, and Stevenson 2015). This, dynamic, too, is 
shown in Lathe. It is easy to place all the responsibility for 
the horrors described in the story at Haber’s feet, but Orr 
allowed his effective dreams to be used. Indeed, his ability 
to scapegoat both Haber and the ATT system as a whole 
contributed to his apathy. Similarly, powerful latent inter-
est groups can more easily ignore harm to marginalized 
populations when they can scapegoat political leaders or 
blame the political system for their inaction. Of course, 
the need for collective action is a hurdle that cannot be 
ignored—no individual can wield the power of the major-
ity alone—but the psychology of apathy and the everyday 
goes much deeper. Powerful elites are only likely to stand 
up for marginalized populations when they feel some 
connection to them. In Lathe, Orr decides to take action 
because he gets to know and love Lelache before she is 
wrenched away from him by Haber’s well-intentioned use 
of his dreams. In the real world, marginalized populations 
are usually the focus of prejudice and bias, rather than 
love or acceptance, making it easy to target them as scape-
goats (Kay et al. 2009). In other words, cycles of rationali-
zation build up antipathies toward scapegoats—whether 
politicians or marginalized populations—that make it 
much less likely that the public or powerful elites will step 
up to demand change. Thus, while the powerful do some-
times stand up for the marginalized—as Orr took action 
to regain Lelache—it is more likely that they will remain 
apathetic, either because they do not recognize their own 
influence (blame is on policy makers/governance insti-
tutions) or because they believe the scapegoat narrative 
(blame is on marginalized populations, environmental 
factors, etc.), or both. 
The governance treadmill
With this plot, Le Guin was clearly drawing parallels to 
well-known instances of despotism and dictatorship, but 
there are also more subtle comparisons to be made. The 
tension between Orr and Haber is predicated on a rather 
fantastic metaphor—effective dreaming—but parallels real 
world power struggles. From Aristotle to Machiavelli to 
Marx to Putnam and well beyond, political philosophers 
have taken sides on the appropriate balance between 
individual and collective action.5 Throughout, the voice 
of marginalized peoples—the Lelaches of the world—are 
seldom heard. This section describes the treadmill and 
then briefly explains how it fits with several literatures. 
The next section will show how the pitfalls identified in 
Lathe can cause the treadmill to be “stuck” in an ineffec-
tive cycle, prolonging environmental harm and increasing 
the likelihood of environmental crisis.
As described in the previous section, Le Guin’s book 
is classic because it captures three fundamental ideal-
types in political systems: the public (Orr), decision mak-
ers (Haber), and marginalized groups (Lelache/everyone 
else in the book). In the story, Haber’s hubris, Orr’s inac-
tion, and Lelache’s powerlessness result in escalating 
cycles of social and environmental harm, culminating in 
near-catastrophe which finally precipitates fundamental 
change that could shift the system into restorative rather 
than destructive cycles. Similar cycles of success and 
failure are observed in the real world, as decision makers 
and political entrepreneurs respond to changing signals 
from different constituencies. While in the book only one 
full transition is observed (with the end of Haber’s use 
of effective dreams), real systems tend to move back and 
forth between ineffective (destructive) cycles and effective 
(restorative) cycles, though collapse is also possible.
We can refer to this set of cycles within cycles as the gov-
ernance treadmill. This is an extension of the management 
treadmill concept described by Webster (2015a; 2015b). 
The term governance is used to indicate that response 
can occur through multiple pathways, including informal 
rules and norms as well as formal regulations or man-
agement measures. As shown in Figure 1, the treadmill 
starts with an environmental problem, which sends sig-
nals to political actors, who put pressure on decision mak-
ers (increasing political concern), who respond by either 
maintaining the status quo or by instituting new rules 
or regulations in order to “solve” the problem. Of course, 
“solutions” are not always perfect—ineffective silver bul-
lets are often applied—so the problem may continue to 
increase or side effects may crop up, keeping the system 
on the ineffective side of the treadmill. However, in some 
cases, governance response reduces the core problem, 
which in turn dampens signals and leads to a decline in 
political concern. The latter can be referred to as a crisis 
rebound effect (CRE) and may lead to a return to less effec-
tive governance and a renewal of the cycle. 
Most social-ecological systems move back and forth 
between effective and ineffective cycles multiple times. 
Sometimes return to the ineffective cycle is due to the 
CRE, but exogenous factors such as an increase in demand 
or the introduction of new technologies can also cause a 
return to the ineffective side. Then, of course, problem sig-
nals would resume and pressure for improved governance 
would eventually increase again. This oscillation between 
effective and ineffective management cycles is the govern-
ance treadmill. While progress is made in many cases, it 
is rarely as rapid or as permanent as would be expected 
under a proactive regime. This is partly due to factors that 
delay response (see more below), and partly due to fac-
tors that undermine effective management, “resetting” 
the treadmill to its ineffective state. In a few cases, the 
treadmill might “stop”, usually when economic conditions 
become unfavorable (e.g. decline in demand, increase in 
costs of production) or when new technologies effectively 
negate the underlying problem (e.g. provision of substi-
tutes, pollution control tech, etc.).
While the causes of switching differ from case to case, 
the pattern of the treadmill is dominant in most issue 
areas. For instance, Webster (2015a) shows that, in fisher-
ies, economic crisis tends to force management to a more 
effective cycle but that regulations revert when prices 
rise or the threat of new entrants is eliminated. For most 
wildlife trade, education in the US, Europe, and Japan 
reduced demand in the 1980s/1990s, making it easier 
to regulate trafficking, but increases in demand from 
China and other transition economies caused a return 
to ineffectiveness in the 2000s. For large scale processes 
like climate change, the treadmill occurs at multiple 
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levels of analysis. Globally, we are still building up politi-
cal will to implement an effective response, though the 
2015 Paris Agreement may be a step in the right direc-
tion. Nationally, climate policy often depends on unre-
lated political trends, such as the back and forth created 
by public vacillation between democratic and republi-
can candidates in the US.6 At the local level, cities and 
communities learn through exposure to climate-related 
extreme events but may also act based on shared envi-
ronmental norms, though both are subject to economic 
conditions and related budget constraints (Zahran et al. 
2006; Brooks et al. 2014; Brody et al. 2008). 
The cycles of the treadmill are not new, though they 
are rarely explained in just this way. In political science, 
Russell Hardin (1982; 1995) uses game theory to describe 
cycles of domination by “elites” that are punctuated by the 
activation of “latent interest groups”, specifically public 
majorities or grassroots movements. Baumgartner and 
Jones (2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2012) show that 
punctuated equilibrium occurs due to the responsive 
nature of governance and related cycles of public atten-
tion. Similar cycles are also observed in theories of organi-
zational change, particularly those associated with March 
and Simon (1993). Interestingly, in a recent interview, 
Bengt Holmstrom, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics 
for his work on incentives and institutions, described simi-
lar cycles of trial and response in both corporate govern-
ance and government policy (Inskeep 2016). Predicated 
on the complex cycles associated with ecological func-
tion, the literature on social ecological systems or cou-
pled human and natural systems usually presumes similar 
cyclical patterns of interaction between environment and 
society, though these are not always explicitly laid out as 
shown in the treadmill (Holling 2001; Walker et al. 2004; 
Ostrom 2007; Liu et al. 2007).  
On the sustainability transitions side, early work 
focused on multi-level analysis is also based in com-
plex systems thinking, with considerable focus on the 
co-evolution of technology and society. However, this 
perspective was decidedly apolitical (Geels 2002; Geels 
2012). Transition management built on multi-level 
analysis by providing a policy toolkit designed to facili-
tate socio-technical transition via the creation of new 
technological “niches” (Loorbach 2010; Kern and Smith 
2008). While stakeholder engagement is a major tool in 
the TM kit, it has been widely criticized for omitting poli-
tics both in theory (Meadowcroft 2011) and in practice 
(Avelino 2009; Hendriks 2009).  A number of authors 
have worked to bridge this gap, either through insti-
tutional design (Hendriks 2016), inclusion of interest 
group politics (Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and Meadowcroft 
2012), embedding policy making in transition manage-
ment (Voß 2014), or focusing on a “post-foundational” 
notion of democracy that goes beyond the voting public 
to consider representation of stakeholders as minority 
interest groups that might otherwise be ignored (Jhagroe 
and Loorbach 2015). Approaches that bring politics into 
transition management include cycles of signals and 
response with political ramifications, though the focus 
largely remains on bureaucratic response to calls for 
better energy efficiency, and so they do not really cap-
ture the full scope of the governance treadmill, or the 
effects of pitfalls like power disconnects or cycles of 
rationalization.
Figure 1: The Governance Treadmill. The right-hand side shows an ineffective cycle, in which environmental problems 
send out socio-economic signals that lead to increasing political concern. As long as governance is ineffective this 
cycle will continue as the problem increases, signals become stronger, and political concern grows. However, once 
concern is high enough given available governance options, it is possible to switch to an effective cycle, where the 
problem decreases, signals weaken, and political concern declines in a process called the crisis rebound effect (CRE). 
The CRE, along with exogenous factors, can then cause a switch back to the ineffective cycle, starting another rotation 
of the treadmill, which oscillates between more and less effective environmental governance. Disconnects that block 
problem signals can delay switching from ineffective to effective cycles while strong institutions can prolong periods 
of effective governance (not shown). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.212.f1
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Pitfalls on the treadmill
The pitfalls described in Lathe cause governance to stay 
on the ineffective side of the treadmill until the prob-
lem becomes so severe that crisis triggers strong action. 
If there are power disconnects, then problems are only 
affecting marginalized populations, which means that it 
takes much longer for political concern to build up and 
for the system to switch to the more effective cycle. The 
situation must become either very dire or must spread to 
larger segments of the population before action is taken. 
Furthermore, even when powerful groups are affected, the 
response may be to insulate the privileged by passing costs 
along to weaker (politically marginalized) or broader (the 
public) shoulders. This in itself creates disconnects and 
is essentially what Haber chose to do every time he used 
Orr’s effective dreams. Rationalizing the choice to ignore 
negative side effects and force costs onto other groups fur-
ther widens disconnects by creating psychological barriers 
to empathy with the suffering of others. When scapegoats 
are used as part of the process of rationalization, misattri-
bution ensures that responses target the wrong problem 
and so are necessarily ineffective. This is what happens 
when Haber blames Orr for negative side effects, rather 
than realizing that the method of effective dreaming by a 
disconnected individual is inherently flawed. 
Patterns that parallel the prolonged, ineffective cycles 
described in Lathe are common in the real world, where 
disconnects and cycles of rationalization play a major role 
in preventing effective governance of the environment, 
the economy, and society. From ancient times, conflict 
over resources and political power caused one group of 
humans to rationalize the mistreatment of other groups 
of humans, building up social structures that perpetuate 
hierarchical power structures. Take the eradication and 
subjugation of indigenous peoples under colonialism. We 
tend to think of this as an artifact of the time; a result of 
pervasive racism and cruelty, which was certainly a part of 
the structural context. However, there were those in Spain 
and elsewhere who made moral arguments against the 
killing, enslaving, and displacement of indigenous peo-
ples. In fact, there was an entire discourse on the topic 
during the period, so elites had the opportunity to think 
past their inherited prejudices and choose a less harmful 
course. Nevertheless, the racist, theocratic storyline won 
because it provided decision makers with the best ration-
ale for their choice to benefit from the suffering of oth-
ers (Fitzmaurice 2014). This in turn perpetuated systemic 
injustice and related environmental degradation by keep-
ing the treadmill in an ineffective cycle. Moreover, the 
effects were lasting, as many of the widest disconnects still 
in existence today were created during this period. 
With industrialization in Europe and North America, 
new disconnects were created, sending the treadmill 
down an even more destructive path. Elites began ration-
alizing the unequal effects of pollution on human health 
and ecosystem function as well as the appropriation of 
resources. They found ways to justify the enclosure of 
public land, displacement of peasants to the sweat shops 
of the cities, and the pollution and squalor that met 
them there (Buck 2010). Jobs, progress, and the wealth of 
nations were frequent rationale for the continuation of 
these negative side effects—or what economists would call 
externalities. Interestingly, when pollution affected elites, 
they chose either to move away from pollution sources 
(and often out of inner cities) or to advocate for laws to 
reduce the pollution problem. Early environmental laws 
addressed pollution by moving the source industries away 
from wealthier neighborhoods and into poorer areas. 
However, as workers grew in numbers and in resources, 
their political power increased. Local-scale regulations to 
reduce pollution through factory controls (rather than 
relocation) were passed in many cities of Europe, the US, 
and other industrialized countries, switching the system 
to a more effective cycle for a period of time, though the 
treadmill continues to oscillate to this day (Bullard 2005; 
Taylor 2014; Thorsheim 2006; Wilkening 2004; Cable and 
Benson 1993). 
In the last century, environmental degradation increased 
rapidly with industrialization and economic growth in 
other parts of the world. Local elites in emerging econo-
mies again rationalized the negative effects of industri-
alization as necessary evils associated with progress. In 
China, the communist-capitalist elites learned from the 
experience of Britain, arguing that “sheep ate people” dur-
ing the enclosures that forced peasants to make way for 
wool production during the Industrial Revolution and 
that the same type of sacrifice is a pivotal part of this stage 
in their own development (Zhao 2004). Growing envi-
ronmental crisis is now sparking environmental concern 
in China and other emergent economies, contributing 
to improved response both at the domestic and interna-
tional levels (Wang 2015; Huan 2014; Cunningham 2015; 
Phillips 2016). Of course, these successes are not universal 
and they come with their own side effects, including the 
displacement of polluting activities to politically margin-
alized areas (Wu et al. 2016; Cai, Chen, and Gong 2016).
At the same time, it is important to remember that 
China is making products for consumers in the US, Europe, 
Japan and other developed countries as well as for domes-
tic consumption, so rationalization is also occurring at the 
international level. Both consumers and regulators turn 
a blind eye to problems in the developing world, with a 
few exceptional cases of outrage like the Nike sweatshops 
crisis of the 1990s or recent allegations regarding Apple’s 
abuse of workers in China (Newell 2005; Carmin et al. 
2011; Frost and Burnett 2007; Dauvergne 2005). Periodic 
press coverage of similar events has generated consider-
able pressure to “green” business via corporate social 
responsibility, with greater or lesser success, depending 
on the corporation, but political responses were minimal 
(Pogutz 2008; Gallagher and Weinthal 2012). 
The green business movement is similar to Orr’s awak-
ening and his attempts to protect Lelache, both in intent 
and in insufficiency. The number of businesses produc-
ing sustainability reports, working to create products that 
are less harmful to the environment, and even seeking 
to be “restorative” via ecological innovation has skyrock-
eted over the last two decades, in part due to consumer 
demand for greener, and healthier products (Makower 
2016). This is a good thing. However, many are skeptical 
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about the efficacy of this economic process, both due to 
the prevalence of “greenwashing” and due to the difficul-
ties of changing consumer behavior and purchasing pat-
terns (Clarke and Boersma 2015; Dauvergne 2016; Van 
Den Bergh, Truffer, and Kallis 2011). That is, consumers 
need to buy less, as well as buying green, but this is a 
much more difficult cultural change. Another concern is 
the potential for “green” consumerism provide rationali-
zation for apathy: buying “green” products substitutes for 
more onerous political actions or changes in individual-
level behavior (Lewis 2008; Schudson 2007). This is a form 
of moral license, where doing something “good” gives an 
individual the ability to rationalize subsequent “bad” 
behavior (Cascio and Plant 2015).
Academia has its fair share of Haberesque rationaliza-
tions as well. Perhaps most well-known is the “tragedy 
of the commons”, propounded by Hardin (1968) as an 
allegory for what he saw as the problem of overpopula-
tion, which he blamed directly on the poor. This focus 
on population as a major environmental problem takes 
the spotlight off affluence, which allows a single person 
in a developed country to consume, and waste, much 
more than the average person in a developing country 
(Sachs 2015). In other words, poor people make easy 
scapegoats for our environmental problems (Dauvergne 
2016). 
Even if we discount Hardin’s prejudice, the tragedy of 
the commons essentially blames environmental degrada-
tion on local resource-users, ignoring the ample evidence 
that the worst levels of overexploitation and pollution 
occur when powerful outsiders come in to exploit local 
conditions (Buck 2010; Berkes et al. 2006). Indeed, Elinor 
Ostrom won a Nobel Prize in economics for showing that 
connected communities that experience signals directly 
from environmental problems are usually good at manag-
ing the commons by setting their own rules of access—as 
long as they are protected from outside interference by 
disconnected groups (Ostrom 1990). Consumers, too, are 
absolved from blame by this storyline, even though their 
demand for products creates the incentives to overexploit 
and to lobby for regulations that allow for overexploita-
tion (Webster 2015a; Dauvergne 2008). Nevertheless, the 
tragedy of the commons is the storyline we prefer because 
it pardons both decision makers and the public, plac-
ing responsibility squarely on the shoulders of (partially 
responsible) scapegoats. 
The widest disconnects occur when large segments of 
the public engage in a cycle of rationalization at the same 
time as decision makers. Such movements frequently tar-
get marginalized populations as the “cause” of some per-
ceived harm. It wasn’t just decision-makers who blamed 
slaves for their status in society; it was also slave owners 
and the vast majority of the public who benefited from 
the practice of slavery in the Americas (Fredrickson 1989; 
Patterson 1982; Morgan 2003). Similarly, it was not just 
the Nazi party who blamed the Jews and other “impure” 
races for Germany’s decline, it was also a large portion of 
the German population (Diner 2000; Crew 1994). History 
records many other examples of prolonged conflict due, 
at least in part, to group polarization, where cycles of 
rationalization reinforce scapegoating on both sides 
(Sunstein 2009; Hoffmann 1986; Simon 1995). 
Even with the increase in deliberative democracy in 
recent decades, the public can be persuaded to engage 
in cycles of rationalization centered on “identity politics”, 
which is ultimately the scapegoating of others (Dryzek 
2005). In 2016, it was a majority of the British people who 
voted for the exit of Britain from the European Union, 
joining with some politicians in blaming the EU and 
immigrants for systemic economic difficulties (Henderson 
et al. 2016; Goodwin 2016). Similarly, in the 2016 US elec-
tions, populist candidates on the left (Sanders) and right 
(Trump) were supported by (some) people who cast all 
blame for the increasing inequality in the US on either 
corporations and corrupt politicians (left) or on immi-
grants, Muslims, and corrupt politicians (right). Indeed, 
Trump won the majority of votes in the Electoral College 
in part because of his scapegoating rhetoric (Muller 2016). 
While some of these scapegoats bear partial responsibility 
for current economic conditions (i.e., specific corporations 
and corrupt politicians), both explanations ignore years of 
public apathy, systemic flaws in the US government, and 
fundamental difficulties associated with representative 
democracy. This is not to say that all supporters of either 
candidate take such simplistic positions, just that much 
of their political popularity is due to relatively simplistic, 
“kick the bastards out” narratives. 
A full analysis of the rationale for political backlash is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but one very important 
point needs to be made: empowerment of the marginal-
ized often threatens the privileged. This can be seen in 
all of the broad cycles described above as well as in more 
specific cases. For instance, many on the far right in the 
US and in Europe are expressing fear of cultural loss and 
loss of economic opportunity due to influxes of migrants, 
increases in terror attacks, and anti-racism protests.7 
People deal with this perceived loss of power and result-
ing lack of control in multiple ways, but an important 
compensating mechanism is the construction of spurious 
causal narratives, often including some type of scapegoat. 
Preference for simple explanation of complex issues (like 
climate change) has also been documented (Landau, Kay, 
and Whitson 2015; Meadows 2008; Brock and Carpenter 
2007; Kay et al. 2009). At a smaller scale, participatory 
processes often fail to empower the marginalized because 
of resistance from those who are asked to relinquish influ-
ence or because the powerless are not really free to express 
their concerns when confronting the powerful (Avelino 
2009). Though not reflected in Lathe, these aspects of the 
governance treadmill should not be ignored.
Conclusion
From this brief analysis, we can expect sustainability tran-
sitions to involve political as well as socio-technological 
steps forward and backward, as described by the gov-
ernance treadmill. This results from the constant dance 
between singular action by elites, who often fall into the 
Haberian ideal type, and collective action by the public 
majority, which, once roused from apathy, may take an 
Orrian stance in defense of marginalized populations, as 
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represented by Lelache in the story. However, unlike Lathe, 
the majority may instead choose to scapegoat those who 
have little power to defend themselves, starting off new 
cycles of rationalization. It is these cycles that are most 
devastating and could completely derail the sustainability 
enterprise.  Thus, understanding sustainability transitions 
also means exploring many variations of the governance 
treadmill.
Le Guin’s story highlights two major pitfalls (power dis-
connects and cycles of rationalization) and three minor 
roadblocks (silver bullets, side effects, and scapegoats) that 
tend to keep the governance treadmill stuck in an ineffec-
tive cycle. First, power disconnects occur when the people 
making decisions are insulated from the costs imposed 
by environmental problems. As a disconnected person, 
Haber was able to accept high costs to others for great 
benefits to himself when he appropriated Orr’s “effec-
tive dreams” to his own supposedly altruistic ends. At the 
same time, Orr’s apathy allowed this abuse of his power 
and ultimately the near-destruction of the world. Second, 
these disconnects can be widened by cycles of rationali-
zation, in which decision makers choose to accept credit 
for the positive consequences of the silver bullet solutions 
that they implement, while blaming negative side effects 
on scapegoats. Scapegoats are particularly important in 
cycles of rationalization and may even be the same mar-
ginalized groups who are most harmed by an environmen-
tal problem. 
A number of these pitfalls are already reflected in the 
literature, but there are some important new insights. 
Injunctions to narrow disconnects by including those 
who are most affected in decision-making processes are 
numerous (Reed 2008; Berkes 2003; Hendriks 2016; 
Jhagroe and Loorbach 2015; Klein et al. 2011). Warnings 
to avoid silver bullets and panaceas abound as well (Young 
2001; Ostrom 2007; Liu et al. 2007). There are also several 
frameworks and toolkits available to help communities, 
decision makers, and international regimes select and 
implement measures that get at the heart of environmen-
tal problems while minimizing negative side effects (Folke 
et al. 2005; Loorbach 2010). In addition, there is a grow-
ing literature on climate skepticism and the political psy-
chology of rationalizing environmental degradation more 
broadly (Jacques 2009; Dunlap 2013; Dauvergne 2016). 
However, cycles of rationalization are less well-under-
stood, and the larger process of the management tread-
mill needs more study. Bridging the divides between 
these disparate literatures would be an important step 
forward, as would studies designed to explicitly delve 
into the political as well as social, economic, and techno-
logical aspects of transition (Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and 
Meadowcroft 2012; Kern 2011). Given the important role 
played by the public in many environmental governance 
decisions it would also be useful to draw more from social 
psychology, particularly in relation to public (rather than 
stakeholder) response to large-sale environmental uncer-
tainties (e.g. Whitson, Galinsky, and Kay 2015; Kay et al. 
2009; Landau, Kay, and Whitson 2015). Several factors, 
including compensatory control mechanisms and group 
biases could generate considerable backlash against 
environmental governance even as we experience more 
and more environmental harm. This would completely 
derail the governance treadmill and could lead to even 
greater global crisis.
At a different level, adding emotional appeal to the les-
sons provided by the literature could help to drive them 
home (Keller, Siegrist, and Gutscher 2006). Lathe provides 
vivid imagery of terrible environmental consequences of 
both too little collective action and too much imposition of 
a singular will on society. At the same time, this book also 
reflects deep truths about human response to large-scale 
problems. In the ideal-types of Haber, Orr, and Lelache, Le 
Guin gives us a new storyline; one in which the powerful 
are clearly to blame; either for their actions (Haber) or for 
their inaction (Orr). She shows us how power corrupts, but 
also how apathy and the acceptance of social constraints 
allows that corruption. Furthermore, in the narrative sur-
rounding Lelache and Orr, she shows how connecting the 
public to marginalized peoples can be a countervailing 
force for change. In the end, Lathe describes a cyclical pro-
cess of destruction, but also provides a hope for a more 
connected and a more sustainable world.
Notes
 1 See Galbreath (1980) for a literary discussion of con-
cepts such as holism and the use of the occult as meta-
phor in Le Guin’s works.
 2 In other words, Giddens says that social interaction 
creates institutions, norms, regulations, etc. but then 
these governance structures in turn shape human 
behavior, limiting the range of possible actions by 
assigning power to different actors, limiting the 
actions available, etc.
 3 See Johnston (1999) for a more complete (and literary) 
comparison between Le Guin’s Lathe of Heaven and 
Orwell’s 1984.
 4 Huntington (1975) asserts that Le Guin is really plac-
ing the private world above the public world, since all 
public actions  “lead to failure”.  Aside from the omis-
sion of Orr’s last public act, the salvation of Haber & 
the world, this ignores almost all of the interactions 
between Orr and the aliens which suggest that it is 
Orr’s spiritual reconnection with the rest of the world 
that saves him.
 5 Jameson (2009) actually posits that Lathe of Heaven 
reflects Le Guin’s own Jeffersonian and Thoreauvian 
criticism of the growing welfare state in the US. In 
contrast Theall (1975) claims that Le Guin is using 
Marxian dialectic approaches in building, destroying, 
and rebuilding the various worlds of Lathe. Both are 
incorrect in that they ignore Le Guin’s own references 
to Daoist political philosophy throughout the book. 
Huntington (1975) captures this briefly when he links 
Haber’s failure to save the world to his failure to recog-
nize himself as a “unification of opposites”.
 6 Small island developing states and other countries that 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change are often 
exceptions to this pattern. Yet even in countries like 
the Maldives, shifts from one ruling party to another 
can lead to large swings in climate policy.
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 7 While some conservative populists may believe that 
they are marginalized themselves, this is usually the 
result of a feeling of entitlement and nostalgia for a 
past when they were in positions of privilege, particu-
larly due to racial and gendered governance structures, 
as much if not more than regional or sectoral economic 
conditions (Hochschild 2016; Cramer 2016). It is also 
important to note that media narratives tend to be mis-
leading about the distribution of voters. Take the US 
presidential election; while it is true that the narrow 
margins in several states increased the importance of 
rural, white, lower-income voters, the bulk of support 
for Trump was still with middle and upper-class elites 
(Huang et al. 2016; Kusmin 2012). This is, ironically, 
another form of scapegoating that is perpetuated by 
the media and accepted by elites on both sides of the 
aisle because it plays into common stereotypes.
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